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INTRODUCTION

During the past decade or two, experts on language have increasingly focused their attention on legal issues.' For example, a number
of studies have examined legal language, which includes not only the

speech and writing of lawyers and other legal professionals,' but in a
broader sense encompasses any language, such as that of constitu-

tions, statutes, opinions, contracts, wills, and so forth, that has some
type of legal effect, whether or not drafted by someone with legal

training.' Elsewhere, the law is concerned with more everyday lan-

1. For some general overviews of research on language and the law, see Brenda Danet,
Language in the Legal Process, 14 L. & SoC'Y REV. 445 (1980); Judith N. Levi, The Study
of Language in the Judicial Process, in LANGUAGE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 3 (Judith N.
Levi & Anne G. Walker eds., 1990); William M. O'Barr, The Language of the Law, in
LANGUAGE IN THE USA 386 (Charles A. Ferguson & Shirley B. Heath eds., 1981); Peter M.
Tiersma, Linguistic Issues in the Law, 69 LANGUAGE 113 (1993).
2. See, e.g., DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 11-29 (1963); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 55-59 (1993).
3. See generally FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE EXPRESSION
(1989); Edward Finegan, Form and Function in Testament Language, in 8 LINGUISTICS AND
THE PROFESSIONS 113 (Robert J. Di Pietro ed., 1982); DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED ... : EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (1986); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIs. L. REV. 1179; M.B.W. Sinclair, Law

and Language: The Role of Pragmatics in Statutory Interpretation, 46 U. Prit. L. REV. 373
(1985); Peter M. Tiersma, Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance
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guage, particularly when that language is used to defame someone or
to commit a crime.4 Other researchers have investigated the role of
language in the courtroom, such as how the speech style of a witness
can influence assessments of her credibility.5 A related issue is the

reliability of eyewitness testimony; although various factors can influence such reliability, linguistic considerations like the phrasing of a
question have been shown to be quite important in determining a
witness's response.
Yet in some ways the most significant linguistic research on the

law has focused on the comprehensibility of jury instructions, for in a
very real sense these studies call into question the legitimacy of the

jury system itself. Fundamental to the Anglo-American process of
trial by jury is the assumption that after the presentation of evidence
and argument by counsel, the judge can instruct the jury on the applicable law, and the jury will then apply those instructions to the facts
of the case and return a reasoned verdict.
Few lawyers and judges ever pause to contemplate just how
woefully inadequate this "instruction" often is, especially in more
complex cases.7 Imagine a tax class at a law school in which the

and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1992).
4. See GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE GREAT ESKIMO VOCABULARY HOAX AND OTHER
IRREVERENT ESSAYS ON THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 92-99 (1991); see generally ROGER W.
SHUY. LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE EVIDENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1993); Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REV. 303
(1987); Peter M. Tiersma, The Language of Perjury: "Literal Truth," Ambiguity and the
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1990).
5. See, e.g., John M. Conley et al., The Power of Language: Presentational Style in
the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1385-92.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 560, 561-62 (1975); Elizabeth F. Loftus & Jane Goodman, Questioning Witnesses, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 253, 253-56 (Saul M.
Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985); Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the Interaction Between Language and
Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 585, 586-87 (1974).
7. As one law professor who served on a jury reported:
The judge stepped down from his tomb-like bench. Facing a huge lectern
placed directly in front of the jury box, he proceeded to drone on for fifty-seven
minutes giving us his "instructions." Those instructions did not, in the ordinary or
familiar use of that plain English word, instruct us in any way to do anything that
could have been digestible to an adult without legal training. Internally contradictory in part and ponderously phrased, they were a jumble of comments, legal cliches, cautionary words, cabalistic definitions, and talmudical subtleties on the
themes of reasonable doubt, diminished capacity, lesser included offense, specific
intent, and other legal chestnuts.
Ivor Kraft, Happy New Year: You're a Juror, 28 CRIME & DELNQ. 582, 593 (1982).
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entire course consists of a verbatim reading of the Internal Revenue
Code. Students are not told that they have the right to ask questions,
and the formal atmosphere of the class does not encourage them to
do so. When one summons the courage to pose a question, the professor responds by rereading the entire lecture word for word, so as
not to draw undue emphasis to any particular section of the Code. He
refuses to give students a copy of the Code or to provide any examples or illustrations that might help them understand how the Code
works in practice; he also forbids the students to do outside research.
Then he hands out the final examination.
Surely no reputable law school would tolerate such "instruction."
But this scenario is remarkably similar to the reality faced by many
juries. All too often instructions track the language of an applicable
statute almost verbatim, so that a charge may differ little or not at all
from simply reading the statute.8 When jurors fail to understand an
instruction, judges are reluctant to explain it in ordinary language.9
Compounding the inadequacy of this "instruction" is that unlike law
students, jurors are laypersons not selected for their educational attainments or their promise as legal scholars. At the same time, the decision of the jury may literally be a matter of life and death.
Part II of this Article surveys some of the data showing that
jurors often do not comprehend pattern jury instructions, and explores
some of the linguistic characteristics that make them difficult to understand. Part III continues by tracing to what extent the courts and
jury commissions have responded to these empirical studies. It also
reviews the California civil jury instructions criticized in an article by
Robert and Veda Charrow one and a half decades ago and analyzes
the progress that has been made since then. Finally, part IV of this
Article makes some proposals for further reform, particularly emphasizing the need to inform jurors of their right to ask questions about
instructions that they do not understand, and to receive an adequate
response.

8. See, e.g., Chakos v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 524 N.E.2d 615, 622 (Ill.
App. Ct.) ("[A]n instruction using statutory language is proper if not misleading and if pertinent to the issues involved."), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d 240 (1l. 1988); Krantz v. O'Neil,
240 N.E.2d 180, 186 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (same).

9. Any explanations of the instructions, or illustrations of how they work, are most
likely to be provided by counsel during closing argument. But of course, jurors are routinely
told that it is only the judge who can instruct them on the law, and they may therefore pay
little heed to argument by the parties' lawyers regarding the content of the law.
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11. THE EVIDENCE

Like priests debating fine points of a Latin mass to be delivered
to French-speaking peasants, lawyers devote tremendous energy to
refining arcane statements of the law that mean little to the jury.
Justice Frankfurter noted that all too often instructions to juries are
"abracadabra."1' And as Judge Jerome Frank put it:
Time and money and lives are consumed in debating the precise
words which the judge may address to the jury, although everyone
who stops to see and think knows that these words might as well
be spoken in a foreign language-that, indeed, for all the jury's
understanding of them, they are spoken in a foreign language. Yet,
every day, cases which have taken weeks to try are reversed by
upper courts because a phrase or a sentence, meaningless to the
jury, has been included in or omitted from the judge's charge."
Are the instructions of the judge really like a foreign language?
Surely this is at least a slight exaggeration.' 2 But after years of law
school and daily exposure to terms like "estoppel" and "preponderance," it is doubtful that legal professionals can intuitively gauge the
degree to which laypeople understand legal language. This is a quintessentially empirical issue that can only be resolved by appropriate research. Fortunately, scholars of various disciplines have increasingly
turned their attention to precisely this question.
A.

Empirical Studies of Jurors' Comprehension of Instructions

Roger Traynor, the renowned California jurist, once wrote that
"[iln the absence of definitive studies to the contrary, we must assume that juries for the most part understand and faithfully follow
instructions."' 3 Since Traynor made his assertion over two decades
ago, the studies then lacking have been made, and they have over10. Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 765 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
11. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 195 (Peter Smith 1970). Frank's
point was not that instructions should be made comprehensible, but rather that ordinary jurors
cannot reasonably be expected to understand the law in such a short period of time. He
claimed that the "realistic theory" was that the jury simply determines the law itself. Id. at
329-30.
12. But see Mrs. Ben T. Head, Confessions of a Juror, 44 F.R.D. 330, 336 (1968)
(quoting a former juror's statement to a Tenth Circuit conference) ("[Tihe Judge instructed us
in language none of us understood. It was involved and tedious and long, and so full of
whereases and therewiths that he lost us halfway through. . . . [W]e proceeded to consider
the case according to our rough sense of justice without much regard for the law.").
13. ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 73-74 (1970).
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whelmingly concluded that the assumption that juries adequately understand their instructions is simply no longer tenable. Once it is
established that jurors do not fully understand instructions, the related
assumption that jurors faithfully follow them also becomes subject to

grave doubt. Even with the best of intentions, people cannot follow
instructions that they do not comprehend.
Much research by linguists, psychologists and others has *con-

firmed that jurors tend to have great difficulty understanding the instructions that are supposed to guide their decisionmaking. For example, studies conducted by the team of Amiram Elwork, Bruce Sales,

and James Alfini have consistently shown that jurors have difficulty
understanding standard jury instructions, and that those same jurors
have much less difficulty understanding jury, instructions that have

been rewritten in light of psycholinguistic principles. 4
In one such study, a representative sample of the jury pool in
Lancaster County, Nebraska, viewed a videotape of a mock automobile accident trial that was based on the facts of a real Michigan
case. 5 The subjects were divided into thirty-one juries: sixteen juries

were given the original instructions, and fifteen juries were given
instructions that had been rewritten for greater comprehensibility. 6
The jury deliberatioris were videotaped and analyzed.' 7 Those juries
that received the original instructions experienced more confusion,
allowing one or two individuals to "proclaim expertise and dominate"
the discussion. 8 Juries with the original instructions were also more

14. See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL.. MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE
12-17 (1982) (study groups were given actual jury instructions, then were asked a series of
questions designed to test their understanding of those instructions-the groups answered less
than half the questions correctly, and demonstrated a misunderstanding of many critical legal
issues); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?,
I L. & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977) (two studies found that Michigan pattern negligence instructions were about as useful as no instruction at all-rewriting the instructions made them
significantly more effective); see generally Amiram Elwork et al., The Problem with Jury
Instructions, in THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ON PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 214 (Martin
F. Kaplan ed., 1986); Amiram Elwork et al., Toward Increasing the Comprehensibility of Jury
Instructions, in IN THE JURY Box: CONTROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM (Lawrence S.
Wrightsman et al. eds., 1987); Amiram Elwork et al., Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432 (1982); Bruce D. Sales et al., Improving Comprehension for Jury
Instructions, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (Bruce D. Sales ed., 1977).
15. Amiram Elwork & Bruce D. Sales, Jury Instructions, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 280, 285 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds.,
1985).
16. Id. at 285.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 286.
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likely to discuss legally irrelevant or inappropriate issues. 9 For example, the groups receiving the less comprehensible original instructions frequently ignored the judge's admonition that they should not
consider whether the defendant's insurance would pay a damage
award.2" These juries were also less inclined to discuss a critical issue: whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent." Even after
deliberation, a significant number of jurors who received the original
instructions failed to apply the contributory negligence rule, demonstrating that deliberation did not eliminate confusion.'
Another team headed by David Strawn and Raymond Buchanan

likewise found in several studies that Florida jurors commonly misunderstood instructions and that improved instructions were beneficial.'
In one article, the authors reported on an actual civil case. The

jury instructions were relatively standard, and the trial resulted in a
hung jury.2 On retrial, the instructions were modified to clarify legal
definitions and outline the process that the jury should use to reach a
decision.26 This second jury returned a verdict in ninety-five minutes,
and its members reported that they were all much more satisfied with
the experience.
Laurence Severance and Elizabeth Loftus have also demonstrated

that -comprehension levels for pattern instructions are low and that
rewriting pattern instructions leads to greater understanding.2 8 In a

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 287.
22. Id. at 286-87. It should be noted that jury nullification of the contributory negligence rule may also have been a factor.
23. See David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480-83 (1976) (explaining that Florida standard criminal jury instructions were misunderstood by a large proportion of a study group that received the instructions); see also Raymond W. Buchanan et al., Legal Communication: An Investigation of
Juror Comprehension of Pattern Instructions, 26 COMm. Q. 31 (1978); K. Phillip Taylor et
al., Avoiding the Legal Tower of Babel, JUDGES' J., Summer 1980, at 10.
24. David U. Strawn et al.. Reaching a Verdict, Step by Step, 60 JUDICATURE 383, 38789 (1977).
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id. at 387-88.
27. Id. at 389.
28. See Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 153, 189-94 (1982)
(discussing a study in which researchers found that comprehension errors by college student
subjects were significantly lower overall with revised instructions than with pattern instructions, and that subjects who received revised instruction made fewer requests for clarification
of the instructions).
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study performed on former jurors and people waiting assignment as
jurors in the State of Washington, subjects were shown a videotaped
burglary trial.29 Some were given pattern instructions on reasonable
doubt and related legal concepts; others were given instructions on
the same subjects that were designed to be more understandable while
communicating the same content." A multiple-choice questionnaire
that measured comprehension showed that subjects who received the
revised instructions made fewer errors than those with the pattern
instructions.3' Many other studies have reached analogous conclusions."
B.

What Makes Jury Instructions Difficult to Comprehend?

While most legal professionals would probably agree that jurors

have trouble understanding jury instructions, they would probably not

29. See Laurence J. Severance et al., Toward Criminal Jury Instructions that Jurors Can
Understand, 75 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 213-25 (1984).
30. Id. at 214.
31. Id. at 218-20.
32. See, e.g., REID HAsTiE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 37-58 (1983) (explaining that
members of a panel of jurors made seven incorrect statements about the meaning of the jury
instructions given in a videotaped trial reenactment-only one of which was corrected by
other jurors); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 L. & CoNTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205 (1989) (discussing a study of subjects who were given California criminal jury instructions, and who were then asked eighteen true/false questions, producing results not significantly different from random guessing); Robert F. Forston. Sense and
Nonsense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 612-15 (discussing a study
of Iowa jurors who, following trial, were given a multiple-choice test designed to check their
understanding of the jury instructions they received-jurors who had not deliberated answered
only about fifty percent of the questions correctly, while jurors who had deliberated answered
more than sixty percent of the questions correctly); Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M.
Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401, 425 (1990) (discussing a
project that studied comprehension of instructions by providing true/false questions regarding
rules of law to approximately six hundred actual jurors in Michigan-the instructions (actual
instructions not revised according to linguistic principles) had little impact on comprehension);
Kathleen F. O'Reilly, Why Some Juries Fail. 41 D.C. B.J. 69, 73-74 (1974) (discussing a
study of jurors who were given multiple choice tests to measure their understanding of legal
terms often used in jury instructions-about thirty-three percent chose three or more incorrect
definitions out of ten; about fifty percent missed the question on "preponderance of the evidence"); Valter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent
Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REv. 77, 92 (1988) (demonstrating that comprehension
of pattern instructions by people called to jury service in Dallas County, Texas, was
"dysfunctionally low." although comprehension improved substantially with revised instructions); Charles L. Weltner, Why the Jury Doesn't Understand the Judge's Instructions,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1979, at 18, 23-24 (noting that a convocation of former jurors in Georgia
identified the failure to comprehend jury instructions as a major problem).
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agree as to why this is so. One possibility is that the rules of the
law, which must be conveyed to a group of ordinary citizens within a
very limited period of time, are too complex for the ordinary citizen
to understand. Yet if the law is too complex for laypersons to understand, the legitimacy of trial by jury itself is called into question. Our
system of justice depends on carefully crafted rules of law that are
applied to the facts of a particular case. The Supreme Court has
observed that a "critical assumption" underlying the system of trial by
jury is that "juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial
judge."33 "Were this not so," the Court added, "it would be pointless
for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even more pointless for an
appellate court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was
improperly instructed."'
Except perhaps in cases of jury nullification, our legal system
requires faithful adherence to its rules of law. And even with nullification, the jury must logically first determine what the legally mandated outcome ought to be by applying the law to the facts." Only
then can it nullify that option and produce what it believes to be a
more just verdict. A verdict based on misunderstanding or confusion,
or simply ignoring the law, is not an example of nullification. 6
Hence, even jury nullification presupposes a system in which the jury
ordinarily understands and follows the law. The rule of law means
nothing if legal decisionmakers are ignorant of it or can freely ignore
it.
Consequently, if the law is simply too complicated for lay juries
to understand, we should abolish the jury entirely. In the alternative,
we might argue that juries be used only in straightforward cases that
will not require complicated jury instructions, or at least that in certain types of complex cases (like securities cases) we use jurors with
specialized training in that area. Indeed, arguments of this sort have
been seriously entertained.37

33. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) (plurality opinion).
34. Id.
35. See Alan W. Scheflin & Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury
Nullification, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 165, 166-68 (1991) (noting that when juries nullify,
they do not generally ignore the law, but rather go beyond the law by considering mercy or
justification in addition to their legal instructions). For a general discussion of jury nullification, see Alan W. Sheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 168
(1972).
36. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 35, at 167.
37. See, e.g., James S. Campbell & Nicholas Le Poidevin, Complex Cases and Jury Trials: A Reply to Professor Arnold, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1980) (arguing for elimination of
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While the complexity of the law is surely a relevant factor, a

more fundamental reason for the difficulty that jurors have in comprehending jury instructions is the linguistic nature of the instructions
themselves. Anyone who has ever bought a product unassembled and
tried to put it together realizes that the clarity of the instructions can

make a world of difference. Poorly written instructions that use a
large number of undefined technical terms with no illustrations are
almost impossible to follow; the frustrated purchaser will either give
up or call in an expert. On the other hand, even a very complicated
job can often be performed by'an amateur if the instructions are
sufficiently "user-friendly." Likewise, a jury that is given poorly drafted instructions will probably either give up on the instructions, or
will seek expert advice by asking the judge for assistance or looking
up technical terms in a dictionary or other reference work. On the
other hand, if the instructions are more user-friendly, perhaps includ-

ing illustrations and laying out the logical steps that the jury must
follow to reach a verdict, the jury will be far less frustrated-and will
be considerably more likely to actually apply the law to the facts.

C. The Charrow Study
Robert and Veda Charrow conducted one of the seminal studies

on the comprehensibility of jury instructions, a study in which they
juries in complex cases); Paul Lansing & Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex
Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law Perspective, 14 LoY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. LJ.
121 (1991) (arguing that specialized commercial courts without juries would expedite the
commercial litigation process); Daniel H. Margolis & Evan M. Slavitt. The Case Against
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, LITIGATION, Fall 1980, at 19 (arguing for elimination of juries in complex cases); Jeffrey Oakes, The Right to Strike the Jury Trial Demand in
Complex Litigation, 34 U. MtAMI L. REv. 243 (1980) (arguing for elimination of juries in
complex cases); Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modern Alternatives to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REv. 61 (1988)
(arguing that cases involving complicated issues or technical expert testimony may warrant the
complete or partial elimination of juries); Douglas King, Comment, Complex Civil Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. Cmn. L. REv. 581 (1984) (arguing
that an extraordinarily complex case may be outside the ambit of the seventh amendment);
Rita Sutton, Note, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal
Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. CHI. L GAL F. 575 (arguing that special juries, chosen for
their particular knowledge or experience, could help eliminate current problems of jury confusion in complex cases). But see Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980) (arguing in favor
of juries even in complex civil cases); Maxwell M. Blecher & Candace E. Carlo. Toward
More Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727 (same);
Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense of Juries in Complex Antitrust Litigation, 1 REv. LrrIG. 47 (1980) (same).
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identified some of the linguistic characteristics that make jury instructions difficult to comprehend.38 In the first of two experiments, the
Charrows tested thirty-five prospective jurors in Maryland.39 Fourteen
pattern civil jury instructions used in California ° were recorded on
audio tape and played twice to each juror.4 The jurors were then
recorded on another audio tape as they paraphrased the instructions
they had just heard. 2 The subjects were divided into four different
groups, each of which received the instructions 'in a different order.43
The Charrows scored the paraphrases by breaking each instruction
into segments, then determining how many segments were properly
paraphrased to reach what they called the "full performance" score.'
Subjects did poorly on full performance, obtaining a mean score of
.386; that is, only about thirty-nine percent of the segments were
properly paraphrased.4" The Charrows also created what they called
the "approximation" measure, an alternative scoring scheme in which
only the essential parts of each instruction were scored.46 Yet even
using this more lenient measure of accuracy, the subjects did poorly,
obtaining a mean score of .540; that is, only about fifty-four percent
of all essential parts of the instructions were, on average, correctly
paraphrased.47
A more detailed analysis of the data revealed several noteworthy
conclusions. Not surprisingly, the only demographic factor found to
affect comprehension was the educational level of the subject: higher
education leads to greater comprehension.48 Surprisingly, sentence
length, which is often felt to reduce comprehensibility, had very little
actual effect; the critical issue was not the length but the complexity
of the sentences.49 A simple illustration of this point is that a short
sentence like "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" is incomprehensible

38. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979).
39. Id. at 1312.
40. The Charrows studied California's standard civil jury instructions as compiled in
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL-BOOK

OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (5th ed.

1969) [hereinafter BAI (5th ed.)]. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1311.
41. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1312-13.
42. Id. at 1313.
43. Id. at 1311-14.
44. Id. at 1340-41.
45. Id. at 1361.
46. Id. at 1315.
47. Id. at 1361.
48. Id. at 1320-21.
49. Id. at 1318-20.
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to almost everyone on first encounter. Yet an extremely long sentence, created by the concatenation of short and simple phrases, can
be understood by virtually any child. Imagine, for example, a fairy
tale that begins: "Once upon a time there was a king, and he had a
daughter, and her name was Esther, and she lived in a castle, and one
day she saw a frog in the wishing well" and so forth ad nauseam.
What matters far more than sentence length, according to the
Charrows, is a number of linguistic factors that decrease comprehension. Most of these factors, not surprisingly, are common in legal
writing in general. Among these are the following:
1. Overuse of Nominalizations
Nominalizations are nouns that are derived from verbs. The
easiest way to create a nominalization is to add the suffix "-ing" to a
verb. Thus, "eating" is a nominalized form of "eat," as in "the eating
of crackers can be messy." Creating nominalizations occurs in a variety of fashions: "demonstration" (from the verb "demonstrate"), "failure" (from "fail"), "estoppel" (from "estop"), and "waiver" (from
"waive") are some examples. The Charrows pointed out that
nominalizations are often more difficult to process than their corresponding verb forms. Unfortunately, jury instructions tend to use a lot
of nominalizations." Consider the phrase "failure of recollection is
[common],"'" containing two nominalizations. It is much more direct
to say that "people often forget."
2. Use of "As To"
The Charrows also observed that jury instructions are replete
with "as to" constructions. The following- single sentence contains
three instances: "As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not speculate as to what the answer might have
been or as to the reason for the objection." 2 "As to" is problematic
not only because it is literary and somewhat anachronistic, but also
because its meaning is rather vague.53

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1321-22, 1336.
1345 (emphasis added) (quoting BAJI (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 2.21).
1344 (quoting BAI (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.02).
1322.
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3. Misplaced Phrases
Another common problem with instructions is that prepositional
phrases are sometimes placed in unnatural locations.' For example,
California's civil instructions contained the clause "[i]f in these instructions any rule ... is repeated,"55 instead of the more comprehensible "if any rule in these instructions is repeated." Because "if' is
directly followed by the subject in many sentences, some of the
Charrows' test subjects incorrectly paraphrased the clause as "if these
instructions are repeated." 6
4. Deletion of Relative Pronouns and the Following Verb
Jury instructions often omit relative pronouns like "who,"
"which," or "that" and the following form of the verb "be," a phenomenon sometimes called whiz deletion.7 For instance, California's
civil instructions spoke of "questions of fact submitted to you" 8 instead of the more comprehensible "questions of fact that are submitted to you." Of course, whiz deletion is common in ordinary speech
and writing, but leaving out information may make sentences harder
to process. Consider the phrase "the people evacuated yesterday,"
which in isolation could mean either that they evacuated themselves
or that they were evacuated. With the relative pronoun expressed, this
initial ambiguity is eliminated: "the people who were evacuated" can
have only the latter interpretation.
5. Technical or Legal Lexical Items
It is surely no surprise that lay jurors have great difficulty with
legal terms such as "proximate cause" (which is not widely used
outside the law) or "stipulate" (which has a specific legal meaning).59 While terms of art serve as a convenient shorthand for lawyers, they obviously befuddle those uninitiated into the legal fraternity. Support for this observation is provided by the many cases in
which jurors engage in misconduct by looking up legalisms in dictionaries."

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 1322-23.
Id. at 1323 (quoting BAli (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.01).
Id.
The term "whiz deletion" refers to an omission of the phrase "which is." Id.
Id. at 1323 (quoting BAN (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.00).
Id. at 1324.

60. Use of a dictionary by a jury technically constitutes misconduct, although many
courts have found such use to have been nonprejudicial under the facts at issue. See United
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Failure to Use Modal Verbs

Legal language is often characterized by the use of passive or
impersonal phrasing, instead of more to-the-point constructions using
modal verbs like "must" or "may.,, 61 Thus, jury instructions often
state that "it is necessary for you" or "it is your duty" or "you are
required" instead of the more direct "you must."'62
7. Use of Double or Triple Negatives
In addition to words like "not" or "never," negatives include
words that contain elements with a negative meaning, such as the

prefix "mis-" in "misunderstand" or "un-" in "unreal." The use of
more than one negative in a sentence often causes comprehension
errors. For example, a person who hears the phrase "she did not
misunderstand me" might process it as being semantically negative

("she did not understand," or "she did misunderstand"), whereas in
fact the negatives cancel each other out ("she did understand"). Multi-

ple negatives are endemic in jury instructions, as in the sentence

States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839 (4th Cir.) (jury's reference to a dictionary to look up "motive" and "intent" was misconduct, it was not prejudicial), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979);
Franks v. State, 811 S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1991) (allowing jury to look up "premeditated" was
error but not prejudicial, since dictionary definitions were clearer than instructions); Tate v.
State, 401 S.E.2d 549 (Ga. App. 1991) (juror looking up "aggravate" and "assault" did not
necessitate mistrial because he did not communicate the definition to others); State v. Amorin,
574 P.2d 895 (Haw. 1978) (while it was misconduct for a juror to consult a dictionary for
the definition of "insanity," the misconduct was harmless because juror followed court's definition); State v. McNichols, 363 P.2d 467 (Kan. 1961) (although jury was guilty of misconduct in looking up "culpable," the appellant was not prejudiced by it); State v. Duncan, 593
P.2d 427 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (jury's misconduct in looking up definition of "assault" was
not reversible error; defendant showed no prejudice resulting from it); State v. McLain, 177
S.E.2d 742 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970) (juror's looking up "uttering" in case of uttering forged
check was not prejudicial where jury was instructed to disregard the definition); State v. Holt,
107 N.W.2d 732 (S.D. 1961) (jury's use of dictionary to look up "corporal," "assault," and
"battery" was harmless when state made sufficient showing to overcome presumption of prejudice); Wilson v. State, 495 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (jury's looking up definitions of "care," "custody," and "control" was not prejudicial); State v. Donald, 63 P.2d 246
(Utah 1936) (allowing jury to look up "utter" in prosecution for uttering forged check was
not prejudicial to the defendant). In other cases, use of a dictionary by a jury was found to
have been prejudicial under the facts at issue. See Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499 (9th
Cir. 1987) (juror's use of dictionary to define "malice" was prejudicial); Alvarez v. People,
653 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1982) (jury's use of dictionary to look up "reasonable," "imaginary,"
and "vague" was prejudicial); State v. Williamson, 807 P.2d 593 (Haw. 1991) (juror's taking
a dictionary into deliberation to look up "preponderance" and "entrapment" was prejudicial
misconduct); State v. Holmes, 522 P.2d 900 (Or. App. 1974) (providing jury with dictionary
was prejudicial).
61. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1324-25.
62. Id. at 1325.
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"innocent misrecollection is not uncommon," 63 which contains no
less than three negative elements in a five-word phrase.
8. Use of Passives in Subordinate Clauses
Authorities on legal writing have long been suspicious of the
passive voice.' Charrow and Charrow found, however, that the passive voice impedes comprehension primarily when used in subordinate
clauses-in main clauses, the passive voice does not seem to cause
any particular problems.65
9. Poor Discourse Structure
"Discourse structure" is the overall organization of ideas into
coherent and logical sentences and paragraphs.' The Charrows observed that some jury instructions are poorly organized, containing
ideas on several different topics and not clearly indicating the relationship between them. 67
10. Too Many Embeddings
A final problem with many jury instructions is the large number
of embeddings. 68 Complex sentences are often constructed by combining two or more simple sentences. For example, the simple sentences "I saw the woman at the beach" and "the woman was wearing
a hat" and "the hat had a wide brim" can be combined into one
sentence by embedding the second and third sentences into the first:
"I saw the woman who was wearing a hat that had a wide brim on
the beach." More embedding makes sentences harder to process, as in
the following example, which contains not only embeddings, but also
has passives in the subordinate clauses: "[y]ou must never speculate
to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a wit69
ness."
In a second experiment, the Charrows rewrote the instructions to
eliminate many of the problematic features they had identified, mak-

63. Id. at 1325 (quoting BAi (5th ed.). supra note 40, No. 2.21).
64. See, e.g., Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REV. 727,
746-47 (1978).
65. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1325-26.
66. Id. at 1326.

67. Id. at 1327.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1328 (quoting BAi (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.02); see ELIVORK ET AL.,
supra note 14, at 145-88 (identifying many of the same factors that Charrow & Charrow,
supra note 38, determined to cause comprehension problems).
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ing mostly minor revisions to remain as true to the original as possible.7" Once again, they asked potential jurors to paraphrase the instructions.7 The revision led to substantially better performance, both

on the performance measure and the approximation measure.72
III. THE RESPONSE BY THE PROFESSION

In light of the many studies that have undermined the presumption that jurors adequately understand their charge, as well as research
that pinpoints some of the specific linguistic reasons for the lack of
comprehension, one might expect to find litigants challenging obscure

instructions. In addition, one might expect courts or jury instruction
commissions to advocate reforms. Unfortunately, progress remains

limited. There are, however, hopeful signs for the future.
A.

The Courts

1. The Legal Standard for Evaluating Jury Instructions
Despite some twenty years of research by social scientists, law
professors, and even judges,73 courts have largely ignored the find-

ings that jurors often do not understand the jury instructions that
lawyers and judges labor so hard to craft correctly. The legal standard

for jury instructions remains, primarily, that they must accurately state
the law, or that they must not mislead the jury.74 Indeed, courts at

70. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1328-30.
71. Id. at 1330.
72. Id. at 1332-33.
73. See William W. Schwarzer, Communicating with Juries: Problems and Remedies, 69

CAL. L. REV. 731 (1981) (U.S. District Judge, Northern District of California); Strawn &
Buchanan, supra note 23 (Florida state court judge and a member of the Florida Supreme
Court's Standing Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions); see also Spurgeon Avakian, Let's
Learn to Instruct the Jury, JUDGES' J., Summer 1979, at 40, 42 (California Superior Court

judge advocating the "installment method" of instruction, where jury receives instruction at
various relevant points in the trial, not just at the end); Patrick E. Higginbotham, From the
Bench: Helping the Jury Understand, LITIGATION, Summer 1980, at 5 (United States District

Judge, Northern District of Texas).
74. Coon v. State, 494 So. 2d 184. 186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("A trial court has
broad discretion in formulating its jury instructions, provided they are an accurate reflection
of the law and facts of the case."); Chakos v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 524 N.E.2d
615, 621-22 (III. App. Ct.) (jury instructions should fairly and accurately state the law while
being concise, impartial, free from argument, and not misleading), appeal denied, 530 N.E.2d
240 (III. 1988); Beck v. State, 824 P.2d 385, 390 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) ("[Ihf the totality
of the instructions fairly and accurately state the applicable law, they are sufficient."); First
W. Bank, Sturgis v. Livestock Yards Co., 466 N.W.2d 853, 858 (S.D. 1991) ("When reviewing jury instructions, we look at all the instructions as a whole and. if they provide a full
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times still remark that failure of the jury to understand an instruction
is legally irrelevant.'
Under this approach, the safest course of action for a judge is to
read verbatim from the governing statute or judicial opinion, both of
which by definition accurately state the law. Of course, such documents are not written for lay consumption, and the rules contained in
them therefore need to be translated into terms that legally untrained
jurors can understand.76 Unfortunately, the traditional standard for
appraising instructions on appeal severely discourages efforts by judges to translate the legal language of statutes and opinions into lay

terms.
On the other hand, the traditional standard may be changing.

Several courts have commented-usually in dicta-that instructions
ought to be understandable,77 and some have even referred to the
research on this issue.'" For example, Judge (now Justice) Ginsburg,

and correct statement of the law applicable to the case, the instructions are not erroneous.").
75. See People v. Lee, 269 Cal. Rptr. 434, 438-39 (Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to overturn
conviction on ground of instructional error, despite evidence that jurors did not understand
instruction); John B. Gunn Law Corp. v. Maynard, 235 Cal. Rptr. 180, 183 (Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that "it has never been held error in California to instruct in terms of [a pattern jury
instruction] due to lack of intelligibility"); Biegler v. Kirby, 574 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Or. 1978)
(stating that "[clonfusion or* misunderstanding of instructions is not misconduct justifying a
mistrial"); Davis v. Pacific Diesel Power Co., 598 P.2d 1228, 1230-31 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)
(retrial not granted even though post-trial hearing established that jury had not understood its
instructions); Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
(jury apparently miscalculated damages because it misunderstood its instructions; court held
that while a unanimous clerical error in recording the verdict would have justified a new
trial, a unanimous misconstruction of the language of the charge did not, despite affidavits
from eight jurors that they misunderstood the charge); Kindle v. Armstrong Packing Co., 103
S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) (jury's misunderstanding of meaning of "proximate
cause" was not grounds for new trial).
76. As one commentator has noted, "judges are talking to appellate judges and not to
the jury when giving the instruction." Ronald M. Price, Comment, Study of the North Carolina Jury Charge: Present Practice and Future Proposals, 6 WAKE FOREST INTRAMURAL L.
REv. 459, 466 (1970).
77. People v. Miller, 160 N.E.2d 74, 76-77 (N.Y. 1959) (holding that the court has a
duty to give the jury comprehensible instructions); People v. Gonzalez, 56 N.E.2d 574, 576
(N.Y. 1944) (holding that court's failure to answer jury questions during deliberation was
error, stating that a jury has the right to ask questions and that a judge's failure to answer
or failure to provide an adequate answer to a proper question is reversible error); Commonwealth v. Smith, 70 A. 850, 850 (Pa. 1908) (holding that "when the trial judge has not
succeeded in delivering instructions on the law in such a way that they will be understood
by the jury, his charge is inadequate and open to objection by the defendant."). For a substantial list of other cases requiring jury instructions to be concise and understandable, see
Robert P. Charrow, Book Review, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1094, 1097 n.11 (1983).
78. See, e.g., Bennett v. State, 789 S.W.2d 436, 438-39 (Ark.) (in a murder prosecution,
trial court's failure to instruct jury on all applicable law at conclusion of case was reversible
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citing the research in
this area, noted in her concurring opinion in
7
Tavoulareas v. Piro:1
To arm the jury with the information needed for the intelligent
performance of its task, the judge might first endeavor to speak the
language of the jurors, and avoid the jargon of the legal profession.
Terms familiar to a lay audience, and shorter, less complex, more
active sentences, increase the chance that the jurors will understand
and recall the judge's instructions.:
Another recent case to address the problem is Mitchell v. Gonzales." In Mitchell, the California Supreme Court analyzed the 1986
version of the California Jury Instructions-Civil-Book of Approved
Jury Instructions ("BAJI") No. 3.75, a pattern instruction on proximate cause. 2 It referred to the Charrow study in concluding that the
instruction produced substantial misunderstanding among
laypersons.83 Critically, however, the court did not rely on the finding that the instruction's language created comprehension difficulties.
Rather, it focused on the likelihood that jurors would be misled by
the instruction. In other words, the court largely adhered to the traditional standard that an instruction must accurately (not necessarily
comprehensibly) state the law. As a result, the court disapproved

error), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990); Maupin v. Widling, 237 Cal. Rptr. 521, 525 (Ct.
App. 1987) (criticizing BAi No. 3.75, California's proximate cause instruction, based in part
on Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, but noting it had been retained because of its long
usage); Morgan v. Lalumiere, 493 N.E.2d 206, 210 (Mass. App. Ct.) (stating that instructions
on negligence were deficient, citing jury instruction research, but holding that defendant was
not entitled to a new trial because of failure to object), review denied, 497 N.E.2d 1096
(Mass. 1986); State v. Czachor. 413 A.2d 593, 597 (NJ. 1980) (citing Charrow & Charrow,
supra note 38, for proposition that even correct jury instructions may defy comprehension);
People v. Gonzales, 430 N.Y.S.2d 655, 656-57 (App. Div. 1980) (upholding lower court's
rejection of jury's request to explain jury instruction "in laymen's terms" where defendant
had failed to object, although the dissent commented on the "need to render jury instructions
more understandable to their recipients," and citing a number of studies by judges and psychologists), affd, 453 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1982); State v. Farrar, 786 P.2d 161, 191 (Or. 1990)
(rejecting defendant's offered instruction on mitigating evidence, which tracked the statutory
definition, but citing research by Severance et al., supra note 29, which demonstrated that
juries have trouble understanding pattern jury instructions).
79. 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 808 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
81. 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991).
82. Id. at 873 nn.l-2 ("A proximate cause of [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] is a
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the [injury] [damage] [loss] [or]
[harm] and without which the [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] would not have occurred.").
83. Id. at 877.
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BAJI No. 3.75 and held that the lower court should have given BAJI
No. 3.76, an alternative instruction on proximate cause. 4 At the
same time, the court noted that the Charrow study had found some
comprehension difficulties with BAJI No. 3.76 as well, so it recommended that the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions consider
whether the instruction could be improved by adopting the suggestions of the Charrow study or by otherwise modifying it0
2.

Difficulties in Challenging Incomprehensible Instructions in
Court
Although some judges are at least moderately receptive to studies
regarding jury instructions, virtually no court has overturned a verdict
because the charge, though legally adequate, was difficult for a jury
to understand.86 Clearly, the obstacles to raising comprehensibility
issues in the context of particular cases are formidable. Especially in
criminal cases, judges have considerable discretion in choosing the

precise language to instruct the jury." Perhaps even more critically,
the issue of instructional error must generally be raised at the trial
level."t The party challenging the verdict must have objected to the

84. Id. at 873 n.3 ("A legal cause of [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm] is a cause
which is a substantial factor in bringing about the [injury] [damage] [loss] [or] [harm].").
85. Id. at 879 n.9.
86. See Robert P. Charrow, Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure,
101 F.R.D. 599, 611 (1984) (stating that of all opiriions dealing with jury instructions between 1900 and 1978, only six reversed a trial court because an instruction was incomprehensible); see also People v. Wilson, 65 Cal. Rptr. 839, 844 (Ct. App. 1968) (reversing verdict
where court gave pattern jury instructions instead of using "concrete and direct language");
Pache v. Boehm, 401 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261-62 (App. Div. 1978) (granting new trial where jury
misunderstood instructions regarding apportionment of negligence and contributory negligence).
87. See United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d 580, 588 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[A trial] court has
wide discretion on choice of language [of jury instructions]."); C6on v. State. 494 So. 2d
184, 186 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) ("A trial court has broad discretion in formulating its jury
instructions, provided they are an accurate reflection of the law and facts of the case."). One
limit on this discretion is that judges are often under some pressure to use pattern instructions.
88. See Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (holding that instructional error
must normally be raised in the trial court); United States v. Glickman, 604 F.2d 625, 631-32
(9th Cir. 1979) (holding that appellants who did not object to a supplementary jury instruction at trial "[could not challenge the instruction] on appeal unless the instruction constituted
plain error"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1080 (1980); McCall v. State, 540 P.2d 95, 95 (Nev.
1975) (per curiam) ("The failure to object or to request special instruction to the jury precludes appellate consideration."); People v. Gonzales, 430 N.Y.S.2d 655, 655 (App. Div.
1980) (upholding lower court's rejection of jury's request to explain jury instruction "in
layman's terms" where defendant had failed to object), af'd, 439 N.E.2d 351 (N.Y. 1982);
Davis v. State, 792 P.2d 76, 83 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) ("Appellant's failure to object or
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incomprehensible charge when it was given, and perhaps have offered
an understandable alternative that preserved the meaning of the original charge.t 9
Procedural difficulties aside, proving that the jury instructions in
a particular case were incomprehensible will likewise be challenging.
If a trial court refuses to give requested comprehensible instructions, a

litigant may have to convince the appellate court not only that her
proffered instructions were legally adequate, but that those actually
given were not readily comprehensible to the jury.' It will normally
not be economically feasible to conduct a study of the actual jury

instructions, so the appellate court must be willing to accept expert
testimony-based on more general research-that the instructions at

issue were inadequate.
Where courts decline to accept such expert opinions, the party
challenging the instructions will have to prove that the jury charge in

that specific case was not correctly understood.9 ' Aside from the
logistical obstacles to locating and surveying the actual jury, such
efforts will likely run afoul of the rule that jurors normally cannot
impeach their own verdict after they have been discharged.'

While

offer written requested instructions as to lesser included offenses results in a waiver where
the trial court's instructions accurately state the applicable law."); City of Cheyenne v.
Simpson, 787 P.2d 580, 582 (Vyo. 1990) (holding that the objections to jury instructions
were not sufficiently distinct to preserve issue for appeal).
89. See, e.g., Block v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 290 S.W. 429, 439 (Mo.
1926) (en banc) ("If respondent believed that the meaning of the phrase ['within the apparent
scope of said employee's duty'] was not clear and was likely to be misunderstood by the
jury, it should have requested an instruction defining the phrase."); Bulkley v. Thompson, 211
S.W.2d 83, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948) (if "defendant was fearful that the jury might misunderstand [an] instruction, it was his duty to offer an instruction limiting the effect of the one
given").
90. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 879 (Cal. 1991) (finding instruction
given at trial "grammatically confusing and conceptually misleading," while praising instruction requested below by appellant as "intelligible and easily applied").
91. See, e.g., Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 876-79.
92. See Murphy v. Lake County, 234 P.2d 712, 715 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) ("The
rule is well established in this state that affidavits or other oral evidence of either concurring
or dissenting jurors which tend to contradict, impeach or defeat their verdict, are inadmissible."); Watson v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 827 P.2d 656, 665 (Idaho 1992) (explaining
that juror affidavits cannot normally be used to impeach verdict); Wingate v. Lester E. Cox
Medical Ctr., 853 S.W.2d 912, 916 (Mo. 1993) (stating that affidavit or testimony of a juror
is inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of impeaching the verdict of a jury).
However, the judge may have somewhat more leeway to inquire into the verdict before the jury is discharged. See, e.g., Stevens Markets, Inc. v. Markantonatos, 177 So. 2d 51,
52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that if "it is apparent that the jury misunderstood the
court's instructions and rendered a defective verdict, [it] may be reinstructed and returned to
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the prohibition against impeachment has been eased in cases where

jurors are alleged to have engaged in misconduct,93 the prohibition
remains impervious to attempts to use juror affidavits to reveal their
mental processes or deliberations.' This rule therefore bars a court
from considering the most probative kind of evidence that the jury
was confused by, or did not understand, its instructions.9' Even when

the jury room").
93. See, e.g., Martinez v. Bullock, 535 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Alaska 1975) (stating that a
juror cannot impeach verdict by his testimony or affidavit, absent a showing of fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or any other obstruction of justice); Ertsgaard v. Beard, 800 P.2d 759,
764 (Or. 1990) (explaining that a jury can impeach its verdict only in cases of misconduct
that amounts to fraud, bribery, forcible coercion or any other obstruction of justice that would
subject the offender to a criminal prosecution).
94. See State v. Leonard, 725 P.2d 493, 497 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) ("A defendant cannot impeach the jury verdict by delving into the jury's mental processes or personal experiences."); Rome v. Gaffrey, 654 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that juror
confusion about effect of verdict concerned their mental processes and thus did not justify a
new trial); Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 431 N.E.2d 361, 363 (Ill. 1982) ("It is well established in this State, and almost universally recognized, that a jury may not impeach its verdict by affidavit or testimony which shows the motive, method or process by which the
verdict was reached."); Hoffman v. Deck Masters, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 438, 443 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983) ("The verdict of the jury cannot be impeached by inquiring into the mental processes
by which the jurors reached their verdict.'); see also FED. R. EVID. 606(b), which provides,
in part:
[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course
of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the
verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.
Id.
95. See Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n v. Strand, 382 F.2d 224. 230 (8th Cir. 1967)
(explaining that a jury verdict may not be impeached by juror's affidavit that the jury misunderstood the instructions as to occurrences in the jury room which inhere in the verdict),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967); Walker v. United States, 298 F.2d 217, 226 (9th Cir.
1962) (holding that the trial court properly denied defendant a new trial based on a juror
affidavit alleging misconception by jurors of the court's instructions on entrapment); People v.
Battin, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731, 750 (Ct. App. 1978) (holding that juror's affidavit that she misunderstood instructions was inadmissible to impeach verdict when instructions were proper), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 862 (1978); Davis v. Lira, 817 P.2d 539, 544 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that jurors who misunderstand jury instructions and apparently reach quotient verdict
cannot impeach their verdicts); Andrews v. Idaho Forest Indus., 786 P.2d 586, 588-89 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the trial court correctly refused to consider affidavits from two
jurors claiming that they misunderstood jury instructions); Applebey v. Lenschow, 494 N.E.2d
529, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that affidavits of jurors that they were confused by
instructions were not admissible in motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Fidler, 371
N.E.2d 1381, 1386 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (explaining that a jury verdict may not be impeached on showing that jury "misunderstood the judge's instructions, or erroneously recalled
the evidence, or discussed in their private deliberations matters which the judge struck from
the evidence and ordered them not to consider"), rev'd in part, 385 N.E.2d 513 (Mass.
1979); Johnson v. Ramsey County, 424 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that
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a misunderstanding of the law leads jurors to vote otherwise than
they intended, or to enter the wrong verdict, most jurisdictions will
not allow the verdict to be impeached,96 unless perhaps the jury misunderstanding or incorrectness of the verdict is apparent from the
verdict itself.97
Because of the impeachment rule, it may be impossible to ascertain whether an actual jury in a particular case understood its instruc-

evidence of misunderstood jury instructions cannot be used to impeach the jury's verdict);
State v. Sheldon, 301 N.W.2d 604, 614-15 (N.D. 1980) (holding that testimony that a juror
misunderstood instructions cannot be used to impeach the verdict); State v. Fuino, 608
S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) (holding that a jury cannot impeach its own verdict except to show extraneous prejudicial information or outside influence, and that misunderstanding of instructions does not come within these exceptions).
96. See Santilli v. Pueblo, 521 P.2d 170, 171 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) (jurors may not
impeach verdict where they allege that they misunderstood an instruction, even if they allege
that their verdict would be different if they had understood it correctly: "[T]o allow such
inquiry could subject jurors to harassment and coercion after the verdict and create uncertainty on the finality of verdicts"); Pletchas v. Von Poppenheim, 365 P.2d 261, 264 (Colo. 1961)
(holding that testimony that jurors doubled damage award because they believed attorney
received 50% fee was inadmissible to impeach verdict); Davis v. Lira, 817 P.2d 539, 543-44
(Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that when one verdict form awarded compensatory damages
of $87,300 and a second verdict form awarded exemplary damages of $87,300, and jurors
later indicated they wished to make only one award of $87,000, the jurors could not impeach
their verdict); Taylor v. R.D. Morgan & Assoc., 563 N.E.2d 1186, 1192 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding that juror affidavits, stating that jury misunderstood its instructions and believed it
had to find defendant liable on all three alleged acts of negligence in order to find for the
plaintiff, were not admissible); D.C. Thompson & Co. v. Hauge, 695 P.2d 574, 575-77 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985) (holding that affidavits from discharged jurors stating that the verdict was not
what they intended, apparently because the jury had overlooked the word "fail" in its instruction, did not justify a new trial), aft'd, 717 P.2d 1169 (Or. 1986).
Some jurisdictions do allow juror affidavits to be used to change a clerical error in
the verdict. See, e.g., Cyr v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376, 1381-84 (Me. 1983) (discussing split
of authority on whether affidavits of jurors are admissible to correct a mistake in the recording of the verdict, and holding that in this case such affidavits are inadmissible for that
purpose).
97. See, e.g., In Re Acquisition of Property by Eminent Domain, 690 P.2d 1375, 1380
(Kan. 1984) ("Where under all the facts and circumstances it is disclosed that the jury was
confused in making findings and in awarding damages . . . the verdict should be set aside
on motion for a new trial."); Dicker v. Smith, 523 P.2d 371, 375 (Kan. 1974) (holding that,
since it was apparent from the verdict that jury either misinterpreted or disregarded instructions, new trial was proper); Timmerman v. Schroeder, 454 P.2d 522, 525 (Kan. 1969) ("A
jury verdict which manifests a disregard for the plain instructions of the court on the issue
of damages, which arbitrarily ignores proven elements of damage and which indicates passion,
prejudice or a compromise on the issues of liability and damages should be set aside on
motion for new trial."); Parliman v. Kennelly, 520 So. 2d 445, 446-47 (La. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that an obviously inconsistent verdict should be set aside); Thormahlen v. Foos, 163
N.W.2d 350, 353-54 (S.D. 1968) (stating that, where verdict indicates that jury misconstrued
instruction on mitigation of damages under comparative contributory negligence statute, plaintiff is entitled to new trial).
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tions, at least for purposes of attacking the verdict. Consequently, it
may be necessary to conduct a study on prospective or mock jurors
who match the demographic profile of the actual jury or the demographic profile of the jury pool in that area.
However, even a carefully conducted study demonstrating that
the actual jurors in a particular case had great difficulty understanding
a particular jury instruction may not be sufficient to challenge the
verdict rendered. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit rejected the results of a study showing that many prospective
jurors did not understand the actual instructions in a particular death
penalty case.9 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit held that the researchers had failed to prove that alternative instructions conveying
the same information would have led to greater comprehension."
In summary, parties should not wait until they lose a case to
consider whether the jury will understand its instructions. Particularly
in complex cases, they should submit comprehensible instructions if
they hope to obtain a reasoned verdict, and should object to jury
instructions that do not further this goal. Courts should not only tolerate such efforts, but should encourage them. However, in light of the
obstacles discussed above, it does seem that challenging jury instruction comprehensibility in the context of a particular case will remain
an arduous route to reform.
B. Jury Instruction Commissions
Perhaps a more logical path to increasing juror comprehension of
jury instructions is through the commissions whose task it is to formulate those instructions."t Unfortunately, although the commissions
have made great strides in standardizing instructions, they have historically been less concerned about translating legal principles into language that ordinary jurors can understand.'' At one time, jury instructions were normally drafted on a case-by-case basis, leading to
commonly used instructions being redrafted time and again."0 2 California was at the forefront of the movement to eliminate this duplica98. Gacy v. Welbom, 994 F.2d 305, 308-10 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 269
(1993).
99. Id. at 311.
100. See Steele & Thornburg, supra note 32, at 109 (stating that the best hope for improvement of jury instruction comprehensibility is the pattern instruction movement).
101. ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 5-7 (1979).
102. Id. at 6.
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tion of effort by compiling a list of approved jury instructions:"
By 1978 pattern instructions were being used in thirty-eight jurisdic-

tions. 4 These pattern instructions have not only resulted in time
savings, but may also have led to fewer instructions being struck
down by courts of appeal." 5

Unfortunately, the movement has been less successful in writing
instructions that jurors can understand. Some judges and lawyers have
even expressed reservations about this goal: The California Committee
on Jury Instructions-Civil (the "California Committee"), stated in

1956 that "the one thing an instruction must do above all else is to
correctly state the law. This is true regardless of who is capable of
understanding it."'"° While this comment has been labeled "notori-

ous,"' 7 the California Committee in actuality was merely reporting
the legal standard mandated by the courts at that time and ever since.
Numerous cases have stressed in a general sense that an instruction
must accurately state the law, but virtually none has disapproved a
specific instruction solely because jurors could not understand it."°c

Still, Robert Nieland's study of pattern jury instructions reports
that an early Illinois project established the goal of drafting instructions that were not only unslanted and accurate, but also conversational and understandable."° For that matter, the California Committee,
in its first edition in 1938, solicited assistance from users by requesting that "if you can write [an instruction] that will be clearer to the
lay mind . . . we ask you to give to our committee and to the bar
the benefit of your erudition."" Furthermore, the California Com103. Id.; see also Schwarzer, supra note 73, at 732-40 (discussing the historical role of
jury and the reform movement advocating pattern instructions).
104. NIELAND, supra note 101, at 10.
105. See id. at 18; Sales et al.. supra note 14, at 23, 27 (stating that there is considerable support for the propositions that pattern jury instructions save time for judges, counsel
and jury, and that they reduce reversals for erroneous instructions). But see Robert G.
Nieland, Assessing the Impact of Pattern Jury Instructions, 62 JUDICATURE 185, 188-94
(1978) (discussing a study of Illinois Supreme Court opinions, in which it appeared that the
adoption of pattern instructions had little effect in reducing the total number of appeals, or
the number of times instructional error was the basis of an appeal, or the number of reversals and retrials granted).
106. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIViL-BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
44 (4th rev. ed. 1956) [hereinafter BAli (4th ed.)]
107. Jamison Wilcox, The Craft of Drafting Plain-Language Jury Instructions: A Study of
a Sample Pattern Instruction on Obscenity, 59 TEMPLE L.Q. 1159, 1160 n.2 (1986); see also
Sales et al., supra note 14, at 28 (calling this a "disturbingly comical statement"); Severance
et al., supra note 29, at 201.
108. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
109. NIELAND, supra note 101, at 10.
110. BAl (4th ed.), supra note 106, at 43 (quoting CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUC-
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mittee now aspires to draft instructions that are "understandable to the

average juror," though it cautions that an instruction that has received
appellate approval should not be lightly changed."' Other jurisdictions require that instructions be simple," 2 understandable," l' conversational," 4 free of legal jargon," 5 and/or written in plain language comprehensible to jurors." 6 The Ninth Circuit, expressing an
interest in "improv[ing] the quality of communication with juries,'"
recommends using short sentences and avoiding negatives." 7 It fur-

ther disapproves of reading statutes to the jury, because they are not
drafted with jury comprehension in mind."' Finally, it advises
against using a particular instruction merely because its language has
been approved by an appellate court; such approval does not guarantee that the instruction is necessarily comprehensible." 9
Of course, espousing the goal of drafting understandable instructions does not guarantee its accomplishment. According to Nieland,

meaningful attempts at reform have been made in Pennsylvania, Florida and Arizona, while more limited efforts have been made in Mon-

tana, Michigan, Maryland and Virginia. 2 ° New York and Oklahoma
were planning such efforts when Nieland completed his monograph in
1979.12 Since then, additional progress has been made in Washington, Iowa, and perhaps other states." Several federal courts," en-

TIONS-CIVIL-BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS (lst ed. 1938)).
111. CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL-BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
at vi (7th ed. 1986) [hereinafter BAI (7th ed.)].
112. See, e.g., IDAHO R. CIV. P. 51(a)(2).
113. See, e.g., D. HAW. Cr. R. 235.11(g).
114. See, e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 2.516(D)(4).
115. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. CT. R. 163(C).
116. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. CT. R. 245-3.
117. MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT at iv
(1992).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. NIELAND, supra note 101, at 24-25.
121. Id. at 24.
122. Recently, the Washington Pattern Jury Instruction Committee prepared simplified
alternative instructions, apparently as an experiment. See WASHINGTON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL WPIC 1.01 comment at 6 (2d ed. 1994); id. WPIC 1.02 comment at
11; id. WPIC 1.04 comment at 14. The Iowa Jury Instructions Committee has rewritten the
Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions to eliminate confusing legal terminology and to make the instructions understandable to a lay person. See John H. Neiman, Letters: Iowa Jury Instructions, 74 JUDICATURE 336 (1991).
It has been reported that Montana and Oregon have attempted to draft more comprehensible instructions, using communications specialists. See Bernard S. Meyer & Maurice
Rosenberg, Questions Juries Ask: Untapped Springs of Insight, 55 JUDICATURE 105, 106
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couraged by the Federal Judicial Center, 124 have also made advances

inthis area.
This overview of endeavors to simplify the language of jury

instructions mirrors results obtained in an extensive study of a related
area by J. Alexander Tanford.Ia Focusing on recommendations to
give juries instructions at the beginning as well as the end of trial, as
well as to provide written copies, Tanford found that courts have
actually moved in a direction opposite of that suggested by the research."t s On the other hand, commissions were more prone to adopt
the recommended reforms. 27 Thus, if change occurs, it will probably originate in the relevant commissions. We now revisit the activi-

ties of one such commission: that of California.
C.

California's Civil Jury Instructions: A Brief Analysis

As noted above, California's civil jury instructions were the
subject of intense scrutiny in the Charrow study, published in a law
review with broad circulation. 28 Furthermore, the California civil

(1971). There is similarly a report that around 1970, North Carolina was in the process of
having judges draw up pattern instructions, with an emphasis on simplifying the language of
charges while retaining the substance of the law as approved by appellate courts. Price, supra
note 76, at 468. And Harvey Perlman has described drafting Alaska civil instructions using
the principles described in ELWORK ET AL., supra note 14. Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury
Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research, 65 NEB. L. REV. 520, 531-41
(1986). Of course, without careful analysis it is impossible to determine how successful these
efforts have been.
123. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 117 (the sentiments expressed in the Introduction, as
well as a reading of the model instructions, suggest that substantial progress has been made
in increasing comprehensibility).
124. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PATrERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (1987). In
the introduction to the 1982 Report, reprinted in the 1987 edition, Judge Marshall points out
the difficulties of communicating with a lay jury and the fact that pattern instructions do not
accomplish this very well. Id. at xiii. He observes that "[i]t is all too easy for the lawyers
and judges who engage in the drafting process to forget how much of their vocabulary and
language style was acquired in law school. The principal barrier to effective communication is
probably not the inherent complexity of the subject matter, but our inability to put ourselves
in the position of those not legally trained." Id. The report also contains an appendix, written
by Allan Lind and Anthony Partridge and entitled Suggestions for Improving Juror Understanding of Instructions, that makes suggestions based on the work of the Charrows and the
Elwork, Sales, and Alfini team. Id. app. at 161. Overall, the instructions in this volume appear to have gone a long way towards meeting the Center's goal of greater comprehensibility.
125. J. Alexander Tanford, Law Reform by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury Instructions, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 155 (1991).
126. Id. at 157.
127. Id.
128. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38.
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jury instruction committee now adheres to the goal of formulating
understandable instructions, and the California Supreme Court has
recently encouraged such efforts.'29 It is therefore illuminating to
compare the present jury instructions with those that the Charrow
team studied, to determine whether and how they have been made
more comprehensible.
The following comparison is limited to those instructions that
appear to have undergone primarily linguistic changes since the
Charrows studied them, rather than those instructions that were modified to reflect legal developments. In each case, I will first present
the instruction as critiqued by the Charrow study, and then show its
current wording.
1. BAJI No. 1.00: Respective Duties of Judge and Jury
Text at time of Charrow study:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this
case and you must follow the law as I state it to you.
As jurors it is your exclusive duty to decide all questions of
fact submitted to you and for that purpose to determine the effect
and value of the evidence.
You must not be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or pas"'
sion. 30
The Charrows made several suggestions for improving the comprehensibility of this instruction, most of them fairly minor.' They
noted that the first sentence lacked focus and suggested rewriting it as
two sentences.' The Charrows also found that their test subjects
were confused by the statement in the second paragraph that it is the
jurors' "exclusive" duty to decide questions of fact, since the phrase
is ambiguous: it might mean that this is the jury's only duty, or that
only the jury is to make factual determinations."'

129. Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 879 n.9 (1991) (encouraging the Committee on

Standard Jury Instructions to consider modifying an incomprehensible instruction as suggested
by Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38).

130. BAi (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.00; see Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at
1341.
131. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1342.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Text presently:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
It is now my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to
this case. It is your duty to follow the law.
As jurors it is your duty to determine the effect and value of
the evidence and to decide all questions of fact.
You must not be influenced by sympathy, prejudice or passion." 4
Although the California Committee has not adopted the Charrow
recommendations wholesale, nor apparently even referred to them
publicly, the modifications to BAI No. 1.00 suggest that the California Committee is aware of the study and has taken it into account.
Observe that the first paragraph now consists of two sentences, and
that the word "exclusive" has been purged from the second paragraph.
In addition, the rephrasing of the second paragraph on the
Committee's own initiative clarifies the jury's duties.
Yet although the Committee appears to have responded to the
Charrow study, the linguistic changes to this instruction are decidedly
modest. Recall that the Charrows recommended using modals like
"you must" instead of impersonal constructions like "it is your duty. ' 'I 3S Ironically, where the earlier version of the instruction stated
that "you must follow the law," the present instruction has regressed,
and now incorporates the impersonal instruction: "[ilt is your duty to
follow the law." While this change creates an attractive parallelism
and relates back to the theme of the respective duties of judge and
jury, the Committee may have compromised understanding in the process. On balance, the present incarnation of BAJI No. 1.00 is a definite step forward, but comprehension could still be improved. Consider the following possible alternative, which is more straightforward
and, as far as I can tell, preserves the meaning of the original:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury:
I am now going to tell you the law in this case. You must
follow these rules to reach your verdict.
It is your job to decide the facts. You should consider all the
evidence and then decide what really happened.
Do not let sympathy, prejudice or passion influence your decision.

134. BAi (7th ed.), supra note 111, No. 1.00.
135. See supra part I.C.6.
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2. BAI No. 1.01: Instructions to Be Considered as a Whole
Text at time of Charrow study:
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea is repeated
or stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me
and none must be inferred by you. For that reason you are not to
single out any certain sentence or any individual point or instruction
and ignore the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as
a whole and are to regard each in the light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance. 3 '
The Charrows identified several problematic attributes of BAJI
No. 1.01 that have been eliminated in later revisions.'37 One is the
oddly situated phrase "in these instructions" in the first sentence,
which was discussed above as an example of a misplaced phrase.'38
While poetic, it created the incorrect impression that the instructions
themselves might be repeated, rather than the ideas or rules of law.
The latter part of the first sentence, "no emphasis thereon is intended
by me and none must be inferred by you," was also problematic for
the test subjects.'39 The Charrows pointed out that the phrase not
only contained the archaic "thereon," but also consisted of two negative phrases in the passive voice."
Text presently:
Even if any matter is repeated or stated in different ways in
these instructions, I do not intend any emphasis on it. You must not
single out any individual rule or instruction and ignore the others.
Instead, you must consider all the instructions as a whole and must
regard each in the light of the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative importance.' 4'
Many of the specific linguistic difficulties identified by the
Charrows have been rectified in the present version. In addition, the
Committee has replaced the bookish construction "you are to consider" with "you must consider."

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

BAi (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.01.
Charrow & Charrow. supra note 38, at 1343.
See supra part ll.C.3.
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1343.
Id.
BAi (7th ed.), supra note 111, No. 1.01.
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Nonetheless, other problematic elements of BAJI No. 1.01 persist. In particular, the Charrows doubted that jurors understand the
phrase "as a whole," and typified the instruction that they must consider each instruction "in the light of all the others" as "hackneyed
and probably no longer understood."''
My personal perception is
that these phrases are far from the worst prose found in jury instructions, and the Committee apparently agrees.
While this instruction has clearly benefitted from rewriting, it
still creates a somewhat stilted overall impression. Although courts are
reluctant to tinker with instructions that have withstood the test of
time, the mere fact that an appellate court may have approved a jury
charge as being legally accurate half a century ago is no guarantee
that jurors today will understand it.
Language is constantly changing. Ordinary language in one generation may become formal and contrived a few generations later. For
example, constructions adding as prefixes "where-" or "here-" or
"there-" to prepositions, as in "whereunder" (meaning "under what")
and "herewith" ("with this"), were ordinary English at one time, and
are generally still comprehensible to Shakespeare scholars and, perhaps, lawyers. Most people today, however, have real difficulties
understanding such formations. I sometimes ask people what Juliet
meant when on her balcony she pined: "0, Romeo, Romeo! wherefore art thou Romeo?"' 43 Respondents almost invariably think that
Juliet cannot spot her lover in the garden below, and that she is
asking, "Where, oh where, are you, Romeo?" In fact, "wherefore" is
the interrogative form of "therefore" and means "why" or "for what
reason.""' The common misinterpretation obscures the whole point
of the scene. Juliet is asking Romeo why his name is Romeo
Montague, marking him as a member of the Montague clan with
which her family is feuding, and thus preventing them from being
together. 4 Only in this context can we properly understand the subsequent statements: "What's in a name? that which we call a rose by
any other name would smell as sweet, '

142. Charrow & Cha'row, supra note 38, at 1343.
143. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2. sc. 2, line 33 (Funk & wagnalls
1968) (1597).
144. See WILLIAM T. BETrEN, THE OTHER SHAKESPEARE: ROMEO AND JULIET 136 n.33
(1984) (noting that "wherefore" means "for what reason").
145. Betken translates Juliet's entire question into modem English as "Oh, Romeo! Romeo! Why must you be Romeo?" Id. at 134.
146. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 143, at line 43.
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Obviously, language. changes, and jury instructions need to keep
pace. Not only has language changed, but it appears that in the last
decade or two, passive knowledge of literary and/or archaic language
has declined dramatically. At the beginning of this century, many
Americans regularly heard the anachronistic language of the King
James version of the Bible, and the literature taught in schools concentrated on "great works" or "classics," which generally meant English authors long dead. Presently, most religious services utilize Bibles
and liturgy in today's English, and schools seem to spend far less
time teaching Shakespeare. Because people have little exposure to
earlier stages of the language, they lack even a passive knowledge of
Elizabethan English.
Nonetheless, the legal profession continues to use words and
constructions that were ordinary English several hundred years ago
but have since become extinct. Commissions could be more daring in
their revision of jury instructions, without sacrificing legal accuracy.
For example, in the last sentence of BAJI No. 1.0l," the judge
seems to be telling the jury, "Just because I give one instruction
before another one does not mean that it is more important. The
order of the instructions does not make any difference." If this is
what the judge means, why not just say so?
3.

BAJI No. 1.02: Statements of Counsel; Evidence Stricken
Out; Insinuations of Questions

Text at time of Charrow study:
You must not consider as evidence any statement of counsel
made during the trial; however, if counsel for the parties have stipulated to any fact, or any fact has been admitted by counsel, you
will regard that fact as being conclusively proved as to the party or
parties making the stipulation or admission.
As to any question to which an objection was sustained, you
must not speculate as to what the answer might have been or as to
the reason for the objection.
You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence
that was rejected, or any evidence that was stricken out by the
court; such matter is to be treated as though you had never known
of it.

147. The last sentence of BAi No. 1.01 states: "The order in which the instructions are
given has no significance as to their relative importance." BAi (7th ed.), supra note 111,
No. 1.01.
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You must never speculate to be true any insinuation suggested
by a question asked a witness. A question is not evidence and may
be considered only as it supplies meaning to the answer."
The Charrows emphasized that BAI No. 1.02 contained nine
passives, most of them in subordinate clauses.'49 They further noted

that the instruction was poorly organized.' 50 Finally, the instruction
contained (1) deleted relative pronouns (e.g., "insinuation [which is]
suggested by a question"); (2) several nominalizations (e.g., "stipulation"); (3) misplaced phrases (e.g., "speculate to be true any insinuation"); and (4) "as to" phrases and odd embeddings (e.g., "you will
regard that fact as being conclusively proved as to the party or parties
making the stipulation or admission").' Many of these difficulties
were addressed by the present version.
Text presently:
Statements of counsel are not evidence; however, if counsel
have stipulated to a fact, or one has been admitted by counsel, you
must treat that fact as having been conclusively proved.
You may not speculate as to the answers to questions to which
objections were sustained or as to the reasons for the objections.
You may not consider any evidence that was stricken; that
must be treated as though you had never known of it.
A suggestion in a question is not evidence unless it is adopted
by the answer. Standing alone, a question is not evidence. You may
consider it only to the extent it is adopted by the answer. 2
The first paragraph has been greatly improved by simply advising the jury that "statements of counsel are not evidence," in place of
the ponderous phrase "you must not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during trial." In addition, the "as to" phrase
found objectionable by the Charrows in the phrase "as to the party or
parties" has been stricken. On the other hand, the instruction does not
explain the meaning of a "stipulation," which is a rare word outside
the legal sphere. Further, in ordinary usage it generally refers to requiring something by agreement (e.g., "our contract stipulates that"),
whereas the term here refers to a declaratior or agreement that some-

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

BAl (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 1.02.
Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1345.
Id.
Id.
BAl (7th ed.), supra note I11, No. 1.02.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol22/iss1/2

32

Tiersma: Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions
1993]

REFORMING JURY INSTRUCTIONS

thing is true.
The second paragraph has also been revised, but to my mind less
successfully. Observe that the introductory phrase, "[a]s to any question to which an objection was sustained," has been deleted. While
this phrase did contain the somewhat archaic "as to" and a passive
verb, it helped organize the instruction by providing a smooth transition from the topic of statements of counsel to that of objectionable
questions.
One of the Charrows' more notorious examples of poor syntax
was the first sentence in the fourth paragraph: "You must never speculate to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a
witness." The present text reveals that the Committee has vastly improved this statement of the law.
As in the previous examples, BAJI No. 1.02 is a definite improvement over the version used at the time of the Charrow study.
Yet the Committee has again proceeded quite cautiously. While it has
eliminated many specific barriers to comprehension identified by the
Charrows, it has been far more reluctant to affirmatively reorganize
the discourse structure of the instruction. For example, the final three
paragraphs of BAJI No. 1.02 could be restated as follows without any
real loss of meaning:
Statements of counsel are not evidence. Sometimes, however,
counsel may stipulate to a fact. This means they agree the fact is
true. Or counsel may admit that a fact is true. In either case, you
must treat that fact as having been conclusively proved.
Sometimes I sustain an objection to a question. You should not
guess what the answer might have been, or why I sustained the
objection.
Also, I sometimes order evidence to be stricken from the record. You should treat that evidence as though it does not exist.
Finally, a question by counsel is not evidence. You should
concentrate on what the witness says and ignore any suggestion or
insinuation in a question. A question is relevant only if it helps you
understand the witness's answer.
In paraphrasing this instruction, I have explained what a stipulation is in the first paragraph. In the remaining paragraphs I have tried
to improve the discourse structure by using transitions to indicate that
each paragraph relates to a separate topic. Further, I have added language that aims to introduce each new topic, once again, to improve
overall organization.
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BAI No. 2.21: Discrepancies in Testimony

Text at time of Charrow study:
Discrepancies in a witness's testimony or between his testimony and that of others[, if there were any,] do not necessarily mean
that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is a
common experience, and innocent misrecollection is not uncommon.
It is a fact, also, that two persons witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it differently. Whether a discrepancy
pertains to a fact of importance or only to a trivial detail should be
considered in weighing its significance.'
Among other features, such as the use of nominalizations and
passives, the Charrows faulted BAJI No. 2.21 for containing no less
than three negatives within one phrase: "innocent misrecollection is
not uncommon."'" While there have been some minor linguistic alterations, few of these issues have been addressed in the present version.
Text presently:
Discrepancies in a witness's testimony or between his testimony and that of others[, if there were any,] do not necessarily mean
that the witness should be discredited. Failure of recollection is
common. Innocent misrecollection is not uncommon. Two persons
witnessing an incident or a transaction often will see or hear it
differently. Whether a discrepancy pertains to an important matter or
only to something trivial should be considered by you.'55
A positive change, made by the Committee on its own initiative,
relates to the original sentence "Failure of recollection is a common
experience, and innocent misrecollection is not uncommon." While the
sentence has an attractive parallelism, it is clearly not easy for the
average juror to process. The only real change to this sentence, however, has been to split it in two by replacing "and" with a period. As
the Charrows emphasize, however, shorter sentences are not necessarily easier to understand, conventional wisdom notwithstanding.'56 The
two sentences "I went home. Then I went to bed." are no easier to
process than the single sentence "I went home and then I went to

153. BAl (5th ed.), supra note 40, No. 2.21.

154. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1325.
155. BAl (7th ed.), supra note 111, No. 2.21.
156. Charrow & Chatrow, supra note 38, at 1319-20.
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bed." Interestingly, the Committee itself has recognized this point,
writing in the introduction of a previous edition that "[i]t is a seriously erroneous idea that clarity of expression is assured by the use of
short sentences." ' 7 Obviously, what matters is the complexity of
sentences, and here the Committee has done nothing to change that.
Another concern is vocabulary. Legal terminology is problematic,
but so are nontechnical words that are rarely encountered. The problem may well be compounded by the fact that many prospective
jurors may speak English as a second language, particularly in California.5 8 Will the average juror fully understand words like
"misrecollection" and "discredit"? 159
5.

BAI No. 3.11: Determining the Question of Negligence

Text at time of Charrow study:
One test that is helpful in determining whether or not a person
was negligent is to ask and answer whether or not, if a person of
ordinary prudence had been in the same situation and possessed of
the same knowledge, he would have foreseen or anticipated that
someone might have been injured by or as a result of his action or
inaction. If such a result from certain conduct would be foreseeable
by a person of ordinary prudence with like knowledge and in like
situation, and if the conduct reasonably could be avoided, then not
to avoid it would be negligence."6
The Charrows observed that BAI No. 3.11 consisted of two
long and complex sentences. 6' The first sentence, for example, contained a conditional within a conditional within an embedding. Additionally, the instruction contains archaic and technical terms like "pos-

157. BAi (4th ed.), supra note 106, at 45.
158. Almost half of all residents of Los Angeles County over the age of five speak a
language other than English at home. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION & HOUSING, SUMMARY TAPE FILE 3A 28 (Los Angeles County; Language Spoken at Home). The 1990 census revealed that over 4,400,000 residents speak
only English, while over 2,500,000 speak Spanish or Spanish creole, and over 1.100,000
speak an assortment of other languages. Id. at 31. It seems probable that undocumented immigrants were undercounted and that the number of non-English-speaking people is therefore
greater than the census indicates.
159. "Misrecollection" does not even occur in my dictionary. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1992). Nor can I recollect ever hearing it outside of this context. Further, to be "discredited" ordinarily means to lose face or be
disgraced, not to be disbelieved.
160. BAi (5th ed.). supra note 40, No. 3.11.
161. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1349.
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sessed of knowledge" and "person of ordinary prudence." In terms of
discourse structure, the first sentence lists one question that must be
asked. The second sentence begins to explain what happens if the
answer to the first question is yes, but then unexpectedly interjects
another issue: whether the conduct could have been avoided. With
these problems in mind, compare the present version of BAI No.
3.11.
Text presently:
One test that is helpful in determining whether or not a person
was negligent is to ask and answer the question whether or not, if a
person of ordinary prudence had been in the same situation and possessed of the same knowledge, he would have foreseen or anticipated that someone might have been injured by or as a result of his
action or inaction. If the answer to that question is "yes", and if the
action or inaction reasonably could have been avoided, then not to
avoid it would be negligence. 6 .
Obviously, little has changed. This instruction received a low
comprehension score in its original version" and would probably
fare only marginally better in its current incarnation. One clear improvement is the first part of the second sentence ("If the answer to
that question is 'yes"'), which is far more straightforward than the
original version.
BAi No. 3.11 does illustrate that it can be quite a challenge to
rewrite jury instructions without sacrificing meaning. On the other
hand, a legally adequate but obscure instruction is not particularly
useful, either. The following version of BAI No. 3.11 is my attempt
to reconcile the goals of clarity and legal adequacy:
One way to decide if someone was negligent it to ask yourself
how an ordinary reasonable person would have acted if he [or she]
had been in the defendant's shoes. Would an ordinary reasonable
person have foreseen or anticipated that someone might be injured
because of what the defendant did or did not do? If the answer is
no, the defendant was not negligent.
If the answer to this question is yes, ask yourself a second
question: could the defendant reasonably have avoided the accident
[injury] [result]? If the answer to this question is also yes, the defendant was negligent.

162. BAl (7th ed.), supra note 111, No. 3.11.
163. Charrow & Charrow, supra note 38, at 1349-50.
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To summarize, it is apparent that although California was a
pioneer in the movement to standardize jury instructions, its record in
the subsequent movement-to make those instructions more comprehensible-is mixed. The California Committee has made definite
progress toward its goal of making jury instructions understandable to
the average juror. At the same time, there is still plenty of room for
improvement.
IV.

SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

The most obvious way to ensure that jurors understand the law
that guides their task is to continue efforts to write instructions that
an average juror can understand. A report from the Brookings Institution and the American Bar Association on the civil jury system recently reemphasized the need for such reform."6 To encourage
bench and bar to write comprehensible instructions without undue fear
of reversal, the Brookings report urges appellate courts to be tolerant
of innovations." California's Supreme Court has indicated its approval of attempts to draft understandable jury instructions by referring to the Charrow study."6 Therefore, the Committee on Standard
Jury Instructions in California should redouble its efforts in this direction, as should the committees of other states.
At the beginning of this Article, I observed that it would be an
educational travesty to "instruct" students on tax law by reading the
Internal Revenue Code to them, without providing them an opportunity to ask questions. A chance to ask questions not only allows students to clarify the lesson, but also gives the instructor valuable feedback on whether she has made herself clear. As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted, a jury question about the meaning of its
charge may indicate a fundamental misunderstanding, thus rebutting
the presumption that the jury understood its instructions.167
The formal nature of a trial seems to cause many judges to lose
164. THE 13ROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CHARTING A FUTURE FOR THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM:
REPORT FROM AN AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION/BROOKINGS SYMPosIUM 24 (1992) (recommending that "[iudges . . . tailor jury instructions to the specific case being tried and spell
them out in clear, plain English, free of legal jargon to the extent possible").
165. Id.
166. Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872, 877-78 (Cal. 1991).
167. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Colo. 1986); see also City of Seattle v.
Gellein, 768 P.2d 470, 471-72 (Wash. 1989) (holding that, where jurors in criminal case
asked question indicating they misunderstood critical instruction, "It]he only reasonable conclusion is that the instructions confused and misled the jury").
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sight of the fact that they, too, are educators when it comes to charging the jury. 6 ' Like any good teacher, a judge should explain to
jurors that they have the right to ask questions regarding the instructions. 69 Unfortunately, the indications are that all too many jurors

are unaware that they can do so.'

The many cases in which jurors

consult dictionaries to determine the meaning of a legal term,'

168. See David U. Strawn, The Judge's Role as an Educator, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV.
371, 371-72 (1987) (stating that the rendering of judicial decisions entails the performance of
many different jobs, one of which is to educate the jury).
169. As one court noted at the beginning of this century:
The practice of giving additional instructions to the jury upon their request is so
well settled in this state that we know of no prior instance in which the request
has been refused. So far as we are advised it is the universal practice in the state.
It is immaterial that the court has already charged the jury upon the law of the
case generally, or has given instructions which would answer the request of the
jury. The very fact that the jury, after having been in consultation, have failed to
comprehend the instructions given in the charge and request further instructions, is
of itself sufficient to show the necessity of additional instructions.
Commonwealth v. Smith. 70 A. 850. 851 (Pa. 1908); see also Bollenbach v. United States.
326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946) (holding that a judge must make reasonable efforts to answer a
jury's questions); Cape Cod Food Prods. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 917
(D. Mass. 1954) (judge informed jurors that they have the right to ask questions during
deliberations); Davis v. Lira, 817 P.2d 539, 545 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that a judge
has a duty to respond to questions during deliberation in order to assist the jury in understanding and correctly applying the law), rev'd on other grounds, 832 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1992);
People v. Gonzalez. 56 N.E.2d 574. 576 (N.Y. 1944) (court's failure to answer jury questions
during deliberation was error a jury has the right to ask questions and a judge's failure to
answer or inadequate answer to a proper question is reversible error). But see Waterford v.
Halloway, 491 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (II1. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that court's refusal to answer
jury question was not error. "The decision to answer a jury question is one resting in the
sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed unless that discretion was
abused").
170. See, e.g., Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 431 N.E.2d 361, 363 (II1. 1982) (holding
that the jury could not impeach its verdict by affidavits declaring that "we were confused by
the form of verdicts furnished to us and . . . were uncertain if we could request communication with the presiding judge to obtain clarification of the instructions" and that as a consequence they filled out the verdict form incorrectly); see also Lorelei Sontag, Deciding Death:
A Legal and Empirical Analysis of Penalty Phase Jury Instructions and Capital Decision-Making 193 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Santa Cruz)) ("It is
difficult for jurors to ask the judge for help .. . . When juries do ask for further instruction,
they too often receive pseudo-help in the form of repetition of the original instructions, or
legal definitions as obscure as the original language."); Ellsworth, supra note 32, at 224
(citing study which revealed that few juries actually asked for further information, but that
the judges had not told them they could ask); Symposium. Making Jury Instructions Comprehensible, 8 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 341, 343 (1987) (statement of Judge D. Lawrence Beard)
("I never [ask jurors whether they have any questions about the instructions] . . . but I
would not hesitate to answer an appropriate question if I thought the answer would help the
jury in its deliberation.").
171. See supra note 60 and cases cited therein.
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technically a type of misconduct, provide fascinating evidence that
jurors do not know that they can ask questions, or believe that asking
questions will be ineffectual. 72 If the jurors knew that they could
ask the judge for an authoritative and comprehensible definition, there
would be no reason for them to engage in misconduct by consulting

such outside sources.
Ideally, the judge would simply ask the jurors, after reading the

instructions to them, whether they have any questions. 73 Realistically, however, some judges may be concerned that encouraging ques-

tions at this stage in the proceedings will lead to an overabundance
of queries and comments, many of which could easily be dealt with
by the jurors themselves during deliberations-one juror may under-

stand or recall what another does not.
Perhaps a more practical alternative is for the judge to give

jurors a final instruction that if they have uncertainties about the
instructions that persist during deliberation, they (or perhaps the
foreperson) can give a written note with their query to the bailiff, or
whatever other method the judge prefers." For example, one of the

172. In one such case, the jury asked the judge to clarify the term "negligence:' Rather
than doing so, the judge sent them home for the evening. During deliberations the next day,
one of the jurors pulled out a piece of paper with a dictionary definition of the term. At a
later hearing, it turned out that four other jurors had also-apparently independent of the others--consulted dictionaries. Nichols v. Seaboard Coastlines Ry. Co., 341 So. 2d 671, 672-73
(Ala. 1976).
173. See Making Jury Instructions Comprehensible, supra note 170, at 342 (statement of
Judge Nicholas Cioffi) ("[Judges should] ask whether or not [the jurors] have questions while
you are charging them, right then and there on the spot: 'Do you have any questions?,' 'Do
you understand this?.'"); Strawn, supra note 168, at 381 (suggesting that judges should ask
the jurors questions to test their understanding of the instructions); Symposium, Improving
Communications in the Courtroom, 68 IND. L.J. 1033, 1064 (statement of Judge B. Michael
Dann) ("At the end of the reading and giving of the instructions, judges should consider
asking the jurors before they retire if they have any questions concerning what they just
heard and read:').
174. The pattern criminal jury instructions of the Federal Judicial Center include an instruction, intended to be given before the first break at trial, stating that "If you need to
speak to me about anything, simply give a note to the marshal to give to me." FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONs No. 5 (1987). California's Penal
Code, in section 1138, requires that "[a]fter the jury have retired for deliberation . . . if they
desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case. . . . the information required
must be given." However, it is unclear how often the jury is informed of this right. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1138 (West 1985). In a published opinion consisting solely of a charge to
the jury, the judge informed jurors that they could pose questions to him during deliberations,
although he hoped that it would not prove necessary. Cape Cod Food Prods. v. National
Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900, 917 (D. Mass. 1954). Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, in
their respected study of the American jury, note that the jury is not normally encouraged to
come back with questions, and suggest that it "[might be] good policy for the judge, when
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final instructions might be something like the following:
If you have a question about these instructions during your
deliberations, please reread your instructions, discuss the matter, and
try to answer the question yourselves. If you cannot agree on what
the instructions require you to do, your foreperson should put the
question in writing and give it to the bailiff.
Unfortunately, the present system all too often continues to re-

ward obscurity, even after the jury has indicated that it does not
understand its "instruction" and requests clarification. Usually, the
safest course for the judge is to simply repeat the instructions word

for word.'75 If she tries to explain the instructions in ordinary language, an appellate court might reverse on the ground that she misstated the law." 6 The judge can be relatively confident, however,

that regurgitating the approved or pattern instructions is generally not
reversible, 177 even though these were the very instructions that originally confused the jury and induced them to request clarification in

the first place.
We need to discard this perverse incentive system. As Judge

Charles Wyzanski has written, "the object of a charge to a jury is not

he finishes instructing the jury, to invite it to return to him if questions arise in the course
of deliberations about the charge, the instructions, the verdict form, recorded testimony, or
jury room procedure." HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 512 (1966).

175. An informal survey of the responses of 15 judges to jury requests for assistance
revealed that, while one judge tried to explain the instructions in plain English, and a few
judges provided a written copy or tape recording of the instructions, the majority of the
judges simply reread the instructions to the jury. Some judges refused to explain or reiterate
the instructions at all. Ellsworth, supra note 32, at 223-24; see also Kramer & Koenig, supra
note 32, at 403 n.14 (stating that "judges routinely respond to juror requests to explain instructions by rereading the instruction verbatim").
Severance and Loftus, in a study of juries in King County, Washington, report that
even though Washington juries receive written copies of the instructions, the juries had many
questions regarding intent, reasonable doubt, and multiple charges, including lesser included
offenses. Virtually all judges refused to answer the questions, referring jurors back to the
written instructions. Severance & Loftus, supra note 28, at 164-70.
176. Some jurisdictions have rules that once a written instruction is given, it cannot be
orally qualified, modified, or explained to the jury. See Robert M. Hunter, Law in the Jury
Room, 2 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 13 (1935).
177. Fortunately, there are some exceptions to this generalization. See, e.g., Leonardo v.
People, 728 P.2d 1252. 1254-55 (Colo. 1986) (holding that referring jurors back to the original instructions was an inadequate response to their request for clarification, even if the original instructions were legally adequate); City of Seattle v. Gellein. 768 P.2d 470, 471-72
(Vash. 1989) (holding that referring jurors back to the original instructions was an inadequate
response to their request for clarification, when that request indicated that they had misunderstood a critical instruction).
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to satisfy an appellate court that you have repeated the right rigmarole of words, but to try to make jurors who are laymen understand
what you are talking about."' To achieve this end, judges should
be required to respond to jury questions in ordinary language, explaining legal concepts as best they can, and perhaps providing appropriate examples. 79 In reviewing a case in which a lower court judge

simply reread the original instructions in response to a request for
clarification, one court observed: "[W]hen the jury indicates to the

judge that it does not understand an element of the offense charged
or some other matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the judge has an obligation to clarify that matter for the jury

in a concrete and unambiguous manner.'

8

At least in criminal cas-

es, responding to jury questions is arguably required by due process.' In both criminal and civil cases, the notion that cases should
be decided by the rule of law underpins our entire jurisprudence.
Without effective instruction on the mandates of the law-which must

allow for questions-we have no assurance that the jury system will
further that goal.
It would also be useful for jury instruction committees to keep
track of the questions that juries ask about their instructions.'82 In-

178. Cape Cod Food Prods., 119 F. Supp. at 907. Judge Vyzanski's comment was part
of his plain language charge to the jury, which constitutes the entire published opinion.
179. Judge William Schwarzer of the Northern District of California recommends that
courts provide juries with concrete examples of how to apply instructions in actual factual
situations, integrating the law with the facts presented at trial. Schwarzer, supra note 73, at
744-47.
180. Leonardo, 728 P.2d at 1256.
181. See, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946) ('When a jury
makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy.").
Section 15-4.3(a) of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
provides:
If the jury, after retiring for deliberation, desires to be informed on any point of
law, they shall be conducted to the courtroom. The court shall give appropriate
additional instructions in response to the jury's request unless:
the jury may be adequately informed by directing their attention to
(i)
some portion of the original instructions;
(ii)
the request concerns matters not in evidence or questions which do
not pertain to the law of the case; or
(iii)
the request would call upon the judge to express an opinion upon
factual matters that the jury should determine.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-4.3(a) (2d ed. 1986).
182. At one time, the New York Judicial Conference, the Committee on Pattern Jury
Instructions (Civil) of the Association of Supreme Court Justices, and the Columbia University School of Law monitored the questions jurors asked during deliberations to pinpoint difficulties they encountered in carrying out their task. Meyer & Rosenberg, supra note 122. at
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stead of dealing with recurring requests on an ad hoc basis, the standard instructions should be modified when persistent questions indicate that they are not effectively communicating the law. Appellate
courts seem increasingly sympathetic to efforts to properly educate
jurors. Perhaps if judges find that they are repeatedly explaining certain obscure instructions, they will more actively support efforts to
make these instructions more comprehensible in the first place.
If we continue to entrust lay juries with some of the most momentous decisions made in our society, and if we expect them to
follow the law in reaching those decisions, we have no choice but to
provide jurors with instructions they can understand.

106. Among other things, the questions revealed that the jurors often did not recall specific
aspects of the law on which they were instructed. Id. at 106-07; see also Severance &
Loftus, supra note 28, at 162-73 (evaluating written questions presented by jury to the judge,
as reported by nineteen superior court judges in King County, Washington).
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